Using an event history framework we analyze the adoption rate of national human rights institutions. Neo-realist perspective predicts adoption rates to be positively in uenced by favorable national pro les that lower the costs and make it more reasonable to establish these institutions. From a world polity perspective adoption rates will be positively in uenced by a world saturated with human rights organizations and conferences, by increasing adoption densities, and by greater linkages to the world polity. We nd support for both perspectives in the analysis of the human rights commission. Only the changing state of the world polity is consequential for the founding of the classical ombudsman o ce. We discuss the national incorporation of international human rights standards and its relevance to issues of state sovereignty and national citizenship.
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to this neo-realist perspective, neo-institutional world polity scholars stress the importance of the changing political culture of the world, increasing ("#$'("1)1$(<" 2,.) These core conclusions inform our discussion of the national incorporation of international human rights standards, a discussion that #"<,.) 9.) -"&<) #') #/,) $..9,.) '=) .#" #,) .'6,!,$2(#7;) ("# ,U,+01$%,*) -7) #/,) /$2/17) $(*$6$*9"1) 7,#) 9($6,!."1) ='!+) $() S''., 6,1#_.) four freedoms, freedoms that apply to everyone everywhere in the world @R'!2:"!*#) EJJOT4 2 The articulation of these freedoms in the Atlantic N/"!#,!)'=)BCMB).,!6,*)+91#$01,)09!0'.,.;)' (,) an unintended consequence of the triumph of the mostly Western allies was the triumph of an international human rights regime that was utilized to critique all sorts of regimes, including Western ones and the ones
standards to justify trials for those who had committed "crimes against
of human rights violations. This prosecutorial approach to human rights
commission, has also emerged in more than 30 countries, including V!2,(#$(";)c!929"7;)K,!+" (7; )N/"*)"(
Social Forces 87(3) and a redemptive collective memory that allows for re-integration as a (,) with this emphasis on the role of governments in protecting human rights, international authorities and non-governmental organizations have increas-
machinery explicitly devoted to the enforcement and improvement of human
commonly refers to government-sponsored organs whose functions are
rights. The jurisdiction of a national human rights organization is typically
faults, and recommending corrective measures to relevant organizations '!)$(*$6$*9"1.)
Categories of NHRIs
with other general human rights institutions, including the human rights
mandate for the promotion and protection of human rights have emerged,
on receiving and investigating complaints regarding maladministration, a
of a commission also include human rights education and promotional
Along with the development of these commissions, the human rights '+-9*.+"()'=%&,.)"1.'),+,!2,*)$()#/,)BCCJ.4)8/,.,)(,:)'+-9*.+,()
promotional activities and cooperation with NGOs, relative to the limited
to examine. Historical Trend
represents an era of a human rights revolution):/,!,)"11)#70,.)'=)YPS>.) experienced a rapid growth everywhere. This dramatic expansion, as to explicitly derive their authority from international human rights laws,
unique dimension requires systematic analysis.
Explaining the National Incorporation of Global Human Rights
'!<.;)neo-realist theory and world polity theory and engage in hypothesis testing.
Neo-Realist eory
The classical realist perspective in international relations views nationstates as unconstrained rational-actors pursuing their own interests in an .
of the game." These countries have the economic, political and cultural power to successfully impose their standards on the rest of the world.
national structure or tradition, the lower the level of economic, political and
is one more example of the international rules of the game (Krasner 1982) .
historical fact, the concept of human rights is an artifact of modern Western civilization." A Western heritage is thus expected to co-vary with
democracy and democratization. More sensitive to citizenship rights, the more democratic regimes or newly democratic countries should have an
concrete discussion can focus on the human rights records of varying
is that the costs of alignment with an international human rights regime
The neo-realist perspective predicts that the national incorporation
economies. Wealthier countries tend also to have more democratic
factors that favor the national institutions, wealthier countries are more
victimization of civilians (the comfort women issue, for example) are at
its victims.
crucial predictors of their adherence to or compliance with international
preferences of the more powerful countries, it is less costly for these countries to act in ways consistent with these international rules of the 2"+,4)8/$.)0,!.0,&#$6,)+'#$6"#,.)#/,)='11':$(2)/70'#/,.,.\
the direction of a less democratic regime.
World Polity Institutionalism
The world polity perspective emphasizes the extent to which nation-states
widespread acceptance of models of "proper" nationhood creates a great
and spread through carriers such as international organizations and
strength of these models cum international regime.
expected national commitment to progress and justice goals, an expectation
investments in human capital to demands that the rights of individuals
organizations and conferences that increasingly emphasizes human rights
a human rights regime. This is especially the case if this world involves an
This line of reasoning differs from a neo-realist perspective in some
concerns are more important for the state from a world polity perspective. Secondly, international standards and world models are not merely tools
institutions to comply with changing international standards regarding what
To summarize, the world polity perspective posits that the formation of
The overall world context matters as does the degree to which a country $.),+-,**,*):
international organizations.
international human rights regime. (,_.) region adopt these organizations. 
Data and Methods

Dependent Variables
human rights. 
own weight, we standardize each dimension with z-scores, and sum the two z-scores to constitute an index.
Data come from the Yearbook of International Organizations)@c($'()'=)>(#,!("#$'("1)V..'&$"#$'(.)BCdgQEJJOT4)
International Human Rights Instruments 
$'(,!)='!)P9+"()S$2/#.)@[PNPS)BCdgQ EJJOT4)A"#")&'+,)=!'+)#/,)World Polity Indicators I: Human Rights Treaty !"#$%&"#$'()*"#")(Elliott 2008).
World and Regional Adoption Densities
where we consider the probability that an event occurs in the interval (t, !t), given tha country had not adopted a NHRI at time t or was at risk of the adoption at time t and d this probability by Pr ij (t, t+ !t | T у t). Then, we divide the probability by !t, the length interval, and allow this interval to became smaller and smaller until the ratio reaches i (Allison 1984).
In the analyses of two different forms of NHRIs, we examine the single event, adoption of either a classical ombudsman or a human rights commission. Each year o historical period, 1966-2004 , is seen as an episode in which a focal event is likely to o Past studies demonstrate that the adoption or hazard rates associated with the behav countries are a function of the effects of covariates, rather than of historical time (Fra 2000; Schofer 2003) . Thus, we employ the exponential model, which assumes the oc of an event is a function of other independent variables, rather than of time:
Where ⑀ denotes a constant associated with the i th time period, x it indicates a of covariates measured for each country i that may or may not vary with time t, and ␤ corresponding vector of regression coefficients regarding each variable's estimated e the likelihood that a country i experiences the adoption of a NHRI j during a given yea exponential model has been fruitfully employed in a number of recent cross-national s including research that focuses on human rights developments (Cole 2005; Wotipka a Ramirez 2008).
Results
We report estimates of the adoption rates that each country is likely to establish a NH 1966 to 2004. In models 1-4 of Table 3 we report estimates of classical ombudsman o To avoid high collinearity among the four indicators of the world polity, we enter sepa each of these into the equations in models 1-4. The same strategy is followed when w estimates of human rights commissions/ombudsmen in models 5-8. In all of these an we control for the influence of one type of NHRIs on the adoption of the other, as it is reasonable to expect reciprocal influences in these similar organizational foundings. 
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We report estimates of the adoption rates that each country is likely to establish a N 1966 to 2004. In models 1-4 of Table 3 we report estimates of classical ombudsma To avoid high collinearity among the four indicators of the world polity, we enter se each of these into the equations in models 1-4. The same strategy is followed whe estimates of human rights commissions/ombudsmen in models [5] [6] [7] [8] . In all of these we control for the influence of one type of NHRIs on the adoption of the other, as i reasonable to expect reciprocal influences in these similar organizational foundings (2) Where e denotes a constant associated with the i th time period, x it indicates a vector of covariates measured for each country i that may or may not vary with time t, and b is a corresponding vector of regression
that a country i), U0,!$,(&,.) 
cross-national studies, including research that focuses on human rights are actually negative. As predicted in hypotheses 2 and 3, the level of
We turn now to consider the effects of the indicators derived from world international human rights regime shows the expected effects. Contrary world polity, the strength of the international human rights regime, world and regional adoption densities and the timing of the rights promoting international conferences. All five indicators reflecting world level $(? 9,(&,.) 
